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CHILDREN ARE CRYING AND DYING WHILE
THE SUPREME COURT IS HIDING: WHY
PUBLIC SCHOOLS SHOULD HAVE BROAD
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE OFF-CAMPUS
BULLYING “SPEECH”
Jennifer Butwin*
Bullying has long been a concern for students, parents, teachers, and
school administrators. But technological advances—including the internet,
cell phones, and social media—have transformed the nature of bullying and
allow “cyberbullies” to extend their reach far beyond the schoolhouse gate.
The U.S. Supreme Court established that schools may regulate on-campus
speech if the speech creates a substantial disruption of, or material
interference with, school activities. However, the Court has yet to rule on a
school’s ability to regulate students’ off-campus bullying speech. This Note
examines how various courts have approached the issue, analyzes the
current circuit split, and ultimately proposes that schools should have the
authority to discipline students for off-campus bullying speech.
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INTRODUCTION
Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old girl, was very excited when an attractive
teenage boy named Josh Evans sent her a friend request on Facebook and
began talking to her.1 For several months, Megan rushed home from school
1. Steve Pokin, ‘My Space’ Hoax Ends with Suicide of Dardenne Prairie Teen, ST. LOUIS
TODAY (Nov. 11, 2007), http://www.stltoday.com/suburban-journals/stcharles/news/
stevepokin/my-space-hoax-ends-with-suicide-of-dardenne-prairie-teen/article_0304c09aab32-5931-9bb3-210a5d5dbd58.html [https://perma.cc/93TZ-YA8B].
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to talk to Josh online.2 Megan had a lifelong struggle with weight and selfesteem, but now she had a boy who made her feel pretty.3 And then one day,
Josh told Megan he no longer wanted to be her friend.4 Josh then apparently
shared some of Megan’s messages with others.5 People began commenting
on Megan’s profile, saying things like, “Megan Meier is a slut. Megan Meier
is fat.”6 Megan sobbed.7 She then went to her room and hanged herself.8
Megan died the next day, three weeks before her fourteenth birthday.9 Josh
never existed.10 It was all a cyberbullying hoax.11
Mallory Grossman was a lively twelve-year-old girl who enjoyed
gymnastics and cheerleading.12 In the fall of 2016, Mallory became a victim
of bullying from several classmates, both in person and online.13 After
months of receiving taunts in text messages, Instagram posts, and Snapchats,
Mallory took her own life.14
Jason Lamberth did not know why his beautiful thirteen-year-old daughter,
Hailee, an honor roll student, killed herself.15 Then he read her farewell note.
“Please tell my school that I killed myself, so that the next time (name
withheld) wants to call somebody (expletives), maybe they won’t.”16
Lamberth asserts “[t]here’s no denying bullying played a part in why Hailee
killed herself.”17

2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The person behind this cyberbullying scheme was Lori Drew, the mother of Megan’s
former friend. Jonann Brady, Exclusive: Teen Talks About Her Role in Web Hoax That Led
to Suicide, ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=4560582
[https://perma.cc/HAV3-WEAQ].
12. Samantha Schmidt, After Months of Bullying, Her Parents Say, a 12-Year-Old New
Jersey Girl Killed Herself. They Blame the School., WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/08/02/after-months-ofbullying-a-12-year-old-new-jersey-girl-killed-herself-her-parents-blame-the-school
[https://perma.cc/N8JC-L3VX].
13. Justin Zaremba, The Tragic Suicide of 12-Year-Old Mallory Grossman: A Timeline,
NJ.COM (Oct. 5, 2017, 10:43 AM), http://www.nj.com/morris/index.ssf/2017/08/
timeline_mallory_grossman_death.html [https://perma.cc/4ZMZ-GY8Z].
14. Id.
15. Paul Takahashi, In Wake of Student’s Suicide, School District Forms Anti-Bullying
Task Force, L.V. SUN (Mar. 13, 2014, 6:00 PM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2014/
mar/13/wake-students-suicide-school-district-forms-anti-b/
[https://perma.cc/Y3NXW32M].
16. Trevon Milliard, Father: White Middle School Student’s Suicide Related to Bullying,
L.V.
REV.-J.
(Feb.
28,
2014,
7:26
PM)
(alterations
in
original),
https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/father-white-middle-school-students-suicide-relatedto-bullying/ [https://perma.cc/G5YP-KJGZ].
17. Id.
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Phoebe Prince, a twelve-year-old girl, was bullied in cyberspace.18 Her
sister found her hanging by a scarf in a closet in her apartment.19 The day
Phoebe took her own life, one of the bullies wrote the word “accomplished”
on Phoebe’s Facebook page.20
Ryan Halligan lost his life to cyberbullying.21 He committed suicide by
hanging himself in the bathroom of his home.22
Bullying is a continuing problem.23 More than one out of every five
students report being bullied,24 more than 160,000 kids miss school each day
due to fear of bullying,25 and bullying victims are “about 2.5 times as likely
to try and kill themselves” as nonvictims.26 Studies suggest that involvement
in bullying—as victim or bully—is associated with suicidal ideation and
behavior.27
Traditionally, bullying occurred within school walls. In the 1990s, many
popular television shows portrayed bullying as comedic. Students would get
pushed into lockers28 and the really unlucky ones would get their head
thrown into a toilet (a “swirlie”).29 Unfortunately, the reality is that there is
18. Nancy Gibbs, When Bullying Goes Criminal, TIME (Apr. 19, 2010),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1978773,00.html
[https://perma.cc/
S5QE-JXZZ].
19. Id.
20. Dale Archer, Opinion, Phoebe Prince’s Death Is a Call to Action, FOX NEWS (Apr. 6,
2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/04/06/dr-dale-archer-phoebe-prince-southhadley-mass-bullying-death-da.html [https://perma.cc/DC7N-DAQT].
21. Lisa Capretto, A Father’s Painful Crusade Against Bullying 12 Years After His Son’s
Suicide, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 6, 2016, 1:17 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/john-halligan-ryan-suicide_us_57043f13e4b0537661880e93 [https://perma.cc/6F2FDH4N].
22. Id.
23. “Bullying is certainly not a new problem. Even a cursory look at ancient fairy tales
such as Cinderella or classic literature like The Lord of the Flies reveals the timeless concern
of harassers who leverage actual or perceived power to push others around repeatedly.”
Matthew Fenn, Note, A Web of Liability: Does New Cyberbullying Legislation Put Public
Schools in a Sticky Situation?, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2729, 2735 (2013).
24. DEBORA LESSNE & CHRISTINA YANEZ, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT REPORTS OF
BULLYING: RESULTS FROM THE 2015 SCHOOL CRIME SUPPLEMENT TO THE NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (2016), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2017/2017015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HKK5-TBW7].
25. Eleanor Barkhorn, ‘160,000 Kids Stay Home From School Each Day to Avoid Being
Bullied,’ ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/10/
160-000-kids-stay-home-from-school-each-day-to-avoid-being-bullied/280201/
[https://perma.cc/WM6Z-GGR9].
26. Karen Kaplan, Teens Taunted by Bullies Are More Likely to Consider, Attempt
Suicide, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/10/science/la-scisn-bullying-cyberbullying-suicide-risk-20140310 [https://perma.cc/W3H4-CMSW]; see also
Mitch van Geel et al., Relationship Between Peer Victimization, Cyberbullying, and Suicide
in Children and Adolescents, 168 JAMA NETWORK 435, 438 (2014). See generally Dimitrios
Nikolaou, Does Cyberbullying Impact Youth Suicidal Behaviors?, 56 J. HEALTH ECON. 30
(2017).
27. See generally Melissa K. Holt et al., Bullying and Suicidal Ideation and Behaviors: A
Meta-Analysis, 135 PEDIATRICS, Feb. 2015, at 1.
28. See Boy Meets World: Back 2 School (ABC television broadcast Sept. 23, 1994).
29. See Hey Arnold!: Big Gino (Nickelodeon television broadcast Mar. 15, 1999); 7th
Heaven: Saturday (The WB television broadcast Nov. 4, 1996).
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nothing funny about bullying. And, nowadays, bullying is no longer
confined to school grounds.
Today, cyberbullying is prevalent.30 “Cyberbullying” is bullying through
the use of electronic technology such as cell phones, computers, and online
messaging platforms.31 Cyberbullying commonly occurs through social
media, text message, instant message, and email.32 Today, 77 percent of the
U.S. population has a social media profile,33 and there are approximately
2.46 billion social media users worldwide.34 Facebook has approximately
two billion active users.35

30. See Justin W. Patchin & Sameer Hinduja, Lifetime Cyberbullying Victimization Rates,
CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. (Nov. 26, 2016), https://cyberbullying.org/summary-of-ourcyberbullying-research [https://perma.cc/D7X3-MKCP]; Alexandra Topping, Cyberbullying:
Increasing Number of Children Suffering, Says ChildLine, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2014, 9:16
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/08/cyberbullying-more-childrenaffected-childline [https://perma.cc/H2SX-6D2R]; see also Steven M. Puiszis, “Tinkering”
with the First Amendment’s Protection of Student Speech on the Internet, 29 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 167, 175 (2011) (“Today any student with a computer can post
information on the Internet that can be accessed anywhere in the world, almost
instantaneously.”).
31. “Cyberbullying includes sending, posting, or sharing negative, harmful, false, or mean
content about someone else.” What Is Cyberbullying, STOPBULLYING.GOV,
https://www.stopbullying.gov/cyberbullying/what-is-it/index.html [https://perma.cc/8HVHL89P] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
32. See id.
33. Percentage of U.S. Population with a Social Media Profile from 2008 to 2018,
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/273476/percentage-of-us-population-with-asocial-network-profile/ [https://perma.cc/HT66-N7VU] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
34. Number of Social Media Users Worldwide from 2010 to 2021 (in Billions), STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-network-users/
[https://perma.cc/A2CR-EAX9] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); see also K. G. Coffman & A. M.
Odlyzko, The Size and Growth Rate of the Internet, AT&T LABS-RES. (Oct. 2, 1998),
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/internet.size.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2RTJ-M27Y]
(finding that, in the mid-1990s, the internet growth rate exploded over 100 percent per year).
35. If Facebook were a country, it would be the largest nation in the world. See Josh
Constine, Facebook Now Has 2 Billion Monthly Users . . . and Responsibility, TECHCRUNCH
(June
27,
2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/27/facebook-2-billion-users/
[https://perma.cc/E93F-V6KZ]; Conrad Hackett, Which 7 Countries Hold Half the World’s
Population?, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/07/11/half-the-worlds-population-live-in-just-6-countries/
[https://perma.cc/
MW7T-K8VA].

676

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

Cyberbullying has far-reaching consequences.36 “If someone is picking
on you in the school yard, you can go home,”37 said the mother of a thirteenyear-old boy who committed suicide with a shotgun after cyberbullies
taunted him. “When it’s on the computer at home, you have nowhere to
go.”38
Technological changes in the past twenty years—including the internet,
cell phones, and social media—have extended the reach of off-campus
speech,39 leading to parent complaints that this off-campus conduct disrupts
the learning environment.40 These technological advancements have thus
created new legal dilemmas for public school administrators who are
considering disciplining students.41
While school boards may have broad authority to define disciplinable
conduct, they cannot abridge students’ First Amendment rights.42
Interestingly, “student speech cases are among the most commonly litigated
cases under the First Amendment.”43 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
not ruled on students’ First Amendment rights as to off-campus bullying
speech.

36. Witold Walczak, legal director for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of
Pennsylvania explained, “For students, even though the speech may be protected there’s a big
difference between whispering on a playground and posting on the Internet. They need to
understand you can cause real pain to people on the Internet. The Internet just amplifies the
speech, so the consequences are far greater.” Tim Grant, Bullies Take Intimidation to
Cyberspace, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (June 26, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.postgazette.com/life/lifestyle/2006/06/26/Bullies-take-intimidation-to-cyberspace/stories/
200606260090 [https://perma.cc/5CGM-LX5X]; see also Puiszis, supra note 30, at 174 (“The
spoken or printed word is capable of reaching a finite audience. Information posted on the
Internet can reach a far larger audience potentially anywhere in the world.”).
37. Bob Meadows, The Web: The Bully’s New Playground, PEOPLE (Mar. 14, 2005, 12:00
PM), http://people.com/archive/the-web-the-bullys-new-playground-vol-63-no-10/
[https://perma.cc/YR3M-6KUA].
38. Id.
39. See Donna L. Whiteman, Social Media and the Authority of Kansas School Districts
to Discipline Students, 86 J. KAN. B. ASS’N, April 2017, at 24, 25, 30; see also Carolyn Joyce
Mattus, Note, Is It Really My Space?: Public Schools and Student Speech on the Internet After
Layshock v. Hermitage School District and Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 16 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 318, 321 (2010) (“[L]ower courts are struggling to apply pre-Internet legal
standards to student speech on the Internet because of substantial doubt as to how far school
administrators’ authority extends—or should extend—over student speech made off-campus
that reaches the school environment.”).
40. See Whiteman, supra note 39, at 31 (“Advancements in technology . . . ha[ve] resulted
in school districts receiving increased numbers of complaints from students and parents
concerning students’ off-campus social media speech that affects the school learning
environment.”).
41. See id. at 25–31.
42. See id.
43. Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 396 (2011) (discussing how there are more student speech
cases than cases “dealing with ‘obscenity, indecency, incitement to or advocacy of unlawful
activity, defamation, commercial advertising, [and] campaign finance’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Frederick Shauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007
SUP. CT. REV. 205, 208)).
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This Note addresses whether schools may discipline students for offcampus bullying speech. Specifically, it searches for the proper test for
determining whether a school district has the regulatory authority to
discipline a student for off-campus bullying speech without violating the
First Amendment. Part I provides background on the First Amendment, the
role of public schools as state actors, and the contours of free speech
protection in public schools as established by the Supreme Court. Currently,
courts are divided on whether schools may ever regulate off-campus speech
and, if so, what threshold conditions must be met for that authority. Part II
analyzes how lower courts have approached this issue and describes the
circuit split regarding the proper test for determining whether a school can
discipline a student for off-campus speech. Part III proposes a resolution to
the circuit split by arguing that schools should have broad authority to
regulate off-campus student speech. Specifically, this Note argues that
safety, efficiency, inadequate legal remedies, and fairness support affording
this authority to school administrators.
I. STUDENT SPEECH REGULATION BY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
This Part discusses public schools’ legal authority to regulate student
speech. Part I.A provides background on the First Amendment of the
Constitution and public schools as state actors. Part I.B introduces four
rationales that courts and scholars use to justify giving schools broad
authority to regulate student behavior. Part I.C introduces the existing
Supreme Court precedent establishing the contours of free speech doctrine as
applied to public schools.
A. As State Actors, Public Schools Are Subject to the First Amendment
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”44 The First Amendment
was designed to prevent previous restraints45 on expression. In effect, the
First Amendment promotes the free exchange of ideas46 and protects
unpopular forms of speech.47 It even protects the expression of odious and
44. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment applies to the actions of state actors. See
generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
45. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); see also Estate of Hemingway
v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968) (“The essential thrust of the First
Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it
shields the man who wants to speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet.”).
46. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail.”).
47. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“[T]he government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”); Abner Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1253, 1253 (2011)
(“Why we have such firm protection for speech we abhor is a matter of much debate. To some
extent, it’s because we don’t trust the state to make content-based judgments consistently as a
matter of principle; we fear that too often it will be merely playing favorites, helping friends
and harming enemies.”).
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noxious ideas.48 And while “the immediate consequence of this freedom
may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive
utterance,” the First Amendment is essential to prevent “empower[ing] a
majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.”49
Public schools are state actors primarily because they are run by the state.50
As a result, students in public schools are afforded First Amendment
protections. In contrast, private schools, by their very nature, are not state
actors. Therefore, students in private schools are not afforded the same First
Amendment protections as students in public schools.51 For example, just
last year, Harvard University rescinded offers to students who posted
offensive memes online.52 Those students did not have First Amendment
recourse because Harvard University is a private university.53 Public school
students are still afforded First Amendment protections, despite the broad
regulatory authority conferred on public schools.

48. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011) (finding that the First Amendment
protects signs bearing messages such as “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” and “You’re Going
to Hell” at a former marine’s funeral); id. at 468 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing that the First
Amendment protects a press release stating “God Almighty killed” a former marine and that
the former marine “died in shame, not honor—for a fag nation cursed by God . . . . Now in
Hell—sine die.” (alteration in original)).
49. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21–26 (1971) (holding that the defendant could not,
consistently with the First Amendment, be punished for wearing a jacket in court that read
“fuck the draft”). “[T]he freedom of Speech may be taken away—and, dumb & silent we may
be led, like sheep, to the Slaughter.” Letter from George Washington to Officers of the Army
(Mar. 15, 1783), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-10840
[https://perma.cc/TR5Q-SJR8].
50. The legal control of public education resides with the state. STEPHEN B. THOMAS ET
AL., PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS’ AND STUDENTS’ RIGHTS 2 (6th ed. 2009). State
constitutions and statutes enacted by state legislatures often describe, in very vague and
general terms, the ways schools should be governed. See MICHAEL IMBER ET AL., EDUCATION
LAW 2 (5th ed. 2014); MICHAEL IMBER & TYLL VAN GEEL, EDUCATION LAW 3 (2d ed. 2000)
(discussing how “state constitutions contain vague language stating that there shall be
schools”). “The specificity of statutes governing the operation of public schools varies from
state to state,” but most state laws create local school districts and give school boards the
authority to raise taxes, borrow money, hire and fire teachers, determine the curriculum, and
discipline pupils. KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL
LAW 3 (6th ed. 2005); see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d(b) (2017) (“Each local and
regional board of education shall develop and implement a safe school climate plan to address
the existence of bullying . . . in its schools.”); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 10–18 (2018) (providing
policies and guidelines for the board of education and requiring that every school district craft
policies and guidelines intended to create a school environment free from discrimination or
harassment); cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) (“Each
locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs.”).
51. Safia Samee Ali, Harvard Revokes Admission of Several Students for Posting
‘Offensive’ Memes, NBC NEWS (June 5, 2017, 1:22 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/harvard-revokes-admission-several-students-posting-offensive-memes-n768361
[https://perma.cc/UV3F-FLPR].
52. Id.
53. Id.
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B. Public Schools’ Regulatory Authority Is Broad
While public schools have no inherent powers,54 the Supreme Court views
public education as “perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.”55 Traditionally, courts have conferred considerable deference
to schools because schools were viewed as acting in loco parentis.56 But new
developments in the past four decades have led many courts to abandon the
in loco parentis justification.57
Today, courts still give public school officials broad authority to regulate
student speech. In fact, for a span of forty years (from February 1969 to June
2009), school authorities prevailed in every constitutional challenge brought
by a student that made it to the Supreme Court.58
Courts and scholars provide several reasons why schools should have
broad authority to regulate student speech. First, when public school officials
regulate student speech, the state is acting in a managerial capacity.59 And
when the state acts in a managerial capacity with respect to certain key
functions, like public education, it is entitled to greater authority to regulate
speech.60
Second, judges and scholars often distinguish the rights of students from
those of adults. They reason that “[w]hat may be wholly permissible for
54. The authority to operate public schools must be found in either the express or implied
terms of statutes. ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 50, at 3.
55. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
56. See IMBER, supra note 50, at 98 (“Courts commonly viewed the school as operating
in the place of parents (in loco parentis). This doctrine justified all manner of regulation, just
as true parenthood confers broad powers.”).
57. See id. (“Courts have acknowledged that for most purposes it is more appropriate to
view the school as an arm of the state rather than as a substitute parent.”).
58. Douglas E. Abrams, Recognizing the Public Schools’ Authority to Discipline
Students’ Off-Campus Cyberbullying of Classmates, 37 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 181, 202 (2011); see Richard Arum & Doreet Preiss, Still Judging School
Discipline, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION 238, 249 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009) (“[C]ourts in general
have become less favorable to student claims in court.”); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (recognizing the “comprehensive authority” of
teachers and other public school officials). But see J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch.
Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The authority of public school officials is not
boundless.”).
59. State action regarding speech varies with the type of power the government is
exercising. For example, private speech receives the greatest speech protection, and therefore
general regulation of private speech is heavily scrutinized. But when the state acts in the
capacity of manager of public schools, it has broader authority than when regulating private
speech more generally. See Robert Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996)
(discussing how First Amendment doctrine within managerial domains differs fundamentally
from First Amendment doctrine within public discourse).
60. See Barry McDonald, Regulating Student Cyberspeech, 77 MO. L. REV. 727, 731
(2012) (“[W]hen the government acts in certain capacities to accomplish functions assigned
to it by the people . . . such as . . . educating much of America’s youth, the Court sensibly
gives the government more latitude to regulate speech as necessary to effectively perform and
accomplish its assigned functions.”); see also Post, supra note 59, at 164 (“[T]he state can
regulate speech within public educational institutions so as to achieve the purposes of
education; it can regulate speech within the judicial system so as to attain the ends of justice;
[and] it can regulate speech within the military so as to preserve the national defense . . . .”).
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adults . . . may not be so for children,”61 and therefore “[t]he constitutional
rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the
rights of adults”62—or of children in other settings.
Third, schools are state actors tasked with creating safe learning
environments.63 And fourth, students’ First Amendment rights must be
tempered by “society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”64 This need of balancing First
Amendment rights with society’s countervailing interests has not been
limited to students. In fact, the Supreme Court has found that the First
Amendment provides no protection or limited protection to certain categories
of speech because they have such little social value.65
C. Supreme Court Cases Establish the Free Speech Doctrine’s Contours
as Applied to Public Schools
The Supreme Court has deemed several categories of speech to be so
harmful or so lacking in value as to be outside the protection of the First
Amendment.66 When a person’s speech fits within one of these categories

61. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944).
62. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986); see McDonald, supra
note 60, at 738 (distinguishing between ordinary free speech principles that govern the speech
of general citizens and the less speech-protective rules that govern student speech); see also
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995) (“[T]he nature
of [the State’s power over schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults. . . . [Children’s] Fourth
Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public
schools than elsewhere . . . .”); Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523
F.3d 668, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[H]igh-school students are not adults, schools are not
public meeting halls, children are in school to be taught by adults rather than to practice
attacking each other with wounding words, and school authorities have a protective
relationship and responsibility to all the students.”). But see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
487 (1960) (“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools.”).
63. See Abrams, supra note 58, at 201 (“[S]tudents’ constitutional rights may be limited
because ‘“special needs” inhere in the public school context,’ ‘where the State is responsible
for maintaining discipline, health, and safety.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829–30 (2002))); see also Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 672 (“Mutual respect and
forbearance enforced by the school may well be essential to the maintenance of a minimally
decorous atmosphere for learning.”).
64. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681–83 (“The process of educating our youth for citizenship in
public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must
teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order. . . . The schools . . . may
determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school
that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech.”).
65. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (discussing certain
categories of speech that have so little social value and are “outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality”).
66. See id. at 571–72 (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.”).
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the First Amendment generally offers no protection.67 These categories
include true threats,68 fighting words,69 obscenity,70 child pornography,71
solicitations to commit crimes,72 speech that incites imminent lawless
action,73 defamation and libel,74 and commercial speech at times.75
Interestingly, courts generally have not applied these First Amendment
carveouts to students. Instead, the Supreme Court has established a separate
doctrine for regulating student speech.76
Part I.C.1 discusses the Supreme Court cases that outline the four types of
student speech that schools may restrict. Part I.C.2 focuses on Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,77 the leading authority on
the issue of whether schools may regulate on-campus student speech,78
which has been widely applied to cases involving off-campus student speech
regulation.79

67. Puiszis, supra note 30, at 176–84; see also Bethany Poppelreiter, Note, When Words
Are Weapons: Using Tinker and Premises Liability Doctrine to Keep Schools Safe in a Digital
Age, 86 MISS. L.J. 643, 648 (2017).
68. E.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (holding that a state may ban
cross burning with the intent to intimidate without running afoul of the First Amendment);
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (“What is a threat must be
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.”); D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch.
Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 764–65 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying the “true threat” test to instant
messages sent from one student, at home, to another student).
69. E.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 568 (holding that “fighting words” are not protected
under the First Amendment).
70. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“[O]bscene material is unprotected
by the First Amendment.”).
71. E.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 299 (2008) (“[O]ffers to provide or
requests to obtain child pornography are categorically excluded from the First Amendment.”);
New York v. Ferber 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982).
72. E.g., Williams, 553 U.S. at 297 (“Offers to engage in illegal transactions are
categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.”).
73. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees
of free speech . . . do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).
74. See generally, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
75. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(outlining the four-part test courts use to determine when restrictions on commercial speech
violate the First Amendment). Under Central Hudson, commercial speech is subject to
intermediate scrutiny which directs courts to consider: (1) whether the expression at issue
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) “whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial”; (3) “whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted”; and (4) “whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”
Id. at 566.
76. See infra Part I.C.1.
77. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
78. “Tinker sets the general rule for regulating school speech, and that rule is subject to
several narrow exceptions [defined by Tinker’s progeny].” J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 927 (3d Cir. 2011).
79. See, e.g., C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016); Kowalski
v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573–74 (4th Cir. 2011).
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1. Student Speech Cases
Students have First Amendment protections and cannot be punished
merely for expressing their personal views about political issues on school
premises.80 As the Supreme Court opined, “It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”81 But over time, the Court
has restricted certain types of permissible student speech in public schools,
thereby giving schools authority to regulate such speech.
The four landmark Supreme Court cases outlining when student speech
may be regulated are Tinker,82 Bethel School District v. Fraser,83 Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier,84 and Morse v. Frederick.85 Together, Tinker
and its progeny cover four types of student speech that schools may regulate:
(1) speech causing a “substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities”;86 (2) “offensively lewd and indecent speech”;87
(3) school-sponsored student publications;88 and (4) speech “advocating or
promoting illegal drug use.”89
2. Tinker
In Tinker, three students wore black armbands to school “to publicize their
objections to the hostilities in Vietnam.”90 School administrators suspended
the students.91 Through their parents, the students sued the school district for

80. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13 (“When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or
on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial
subjects . . . if he does so without ‘materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding
with the rights of others.” (alteration in original) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,
749 (5th Cir. 1966))); see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y.,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))).
81. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (“The
vigilant protection of constitutional freedom is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools.”).
82. 393 U.S. at 503.
83. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
84. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
85. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
86. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
87. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (justifying the regulation of student expression on campus or
otherwise during school-sponsored activities).
88. Hazelwood involves speech that was produced in a journalism class and thus falls
under “school as educator” rather than “school as regulator of student speech.” See 484 U.S.
at 271 (“[E]xpressive activities that students, parents, [or] members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school [may be regulated by the school
administration].”).
89. Morse, 551 U.S. at 394.
90. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
91. Id.
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violating their rights of expression.92 The Supreme Court held that the
regulation,93 which prohibited students from wearing armbands to school and
suspended those who did, was an unconstitutional denial of students’ right of
expression of opinion.94 The Court explained, “the record does not
demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact
occurred.”95
Tinker, which was decided almost fifty years ago, outlined the two-part
substantive test courts use to determine when speech may be regulated in
public schools.96 The test allows school authorities to regulate student
expression if school authorities have reason to anticipate that the expression
would (1) substantially interfere with the work of the school,97 or (2) impinge
upon the rights of other students.98 Once a court decides that the Tinker
substantial-disruption standard applies, “actual or reasonably forecasted
disruption of school functions from the disputed speech is sufficient to
support sanctioning it.”99 Currently, circuit courts are divided as to whether
Tinker’s test applies to off-campus student speech.100

92. Id. at 504, 506.
93. “The principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of the plan to wear
armbands” and subsequently “adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school
would be asked to remove it, and if he refused he would be suspended until he returned without
the armband.” Id. at 504.
94. Id. at 504, 510–11.
95. Id. at 514.
96. Id. at 509, 514. Technically, the “Tinker test” is dictum because the Court held that
the school authorities violated the students’ First Amendment rights.
97. “The substantial disruption inquiry is highly fact-intensive. Perhaps for that reason,
existing case law has not provided clear guidelines as to when a substantial disruption is
reasonably foreseeable. There is, for example, no magic number of students or classrooms
that must be affected by the speech.” J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist. 711
F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2010). A substantial disruption requires something “more
than some mild distraction or curiosity created by the speech” but need not rise to the level of
“complete chaos.” J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 868 (Pa.
2002).
98. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; see also John T. Ceglia, Comment, The Disappearing
Schoolhouse Gate: Applying Tinker in the Internet Age, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 939, 947–48 (2012)
(discussing the two-pronged rule).
99. McDonald, supra note 60, at 737; see Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir.
2008) (holding that Tinker does not require “actual disruption to justify a restraint on student
speech”); Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Tinker does not require
school officials to wait until the horse has left the barn before closing the door. . . . Tinker
does not require certainty, only that the forecast of substantial disruption be reasonable.”).
100. “Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Tinker’s applicability is somewhat
unclear, stating that ‘[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts
should apply school speech precedents.’” Susan S. Bendlin, Far from the Classroom, the
Cafeteria, and the Playing Field: Why Should the School’s Disciplinary Arm Reach Speech
Made in a Student’s Bedroom?, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 195, 196–97 (2011) (alteration in
original) (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007)).
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING PUBLIC SCHOOL AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT SPEECH
Circuit courts have been responsible for addressing off-campus speech
without guidance from the Supreme Court.101 As a result, these courts have
differed in their approaches to the question of whether schools have the
authority to regulate students’ off-campus speech.102
This Part analyzes the different approaches courts use to determine
whether schools have the regulatory authority to discipline students for their
off-campus speech. Some courts hold that schools may never regulate offcampus speech and, therefore, that Tinker’s test for regulating student speech
does not apply to off-campus speech.103 A second group of courts holds that
schools may sometimes regulate off-campus speech.104 These courts apply
Tinker’s test only after a threshold jurisdictional inquiry.105 A third group of
courts holds that schools always have the authority to regulate off-campus
speech and that Tinker is the only test needed to determine when schools may
discipline students for off-campus speech.106
A. Schools May Never Regulate Off-Campus Speech: Tinker Does Not
Apply to Off-Campus Speech
Some courts refuse to apply Tinker to off-campus speech.107 These courts
have established a bright-line rule along geographical lines—the
“geographical-nexus” test.108 If speech originates off campus then schools
cannot regulate the speech.109 Therefore, off-campus speech will never be
subject to the Tinker test. Instead, general First Amendment principles would
apply.110
101. But see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (“[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which
for any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion
of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of speech.”); Puiszis, supra note 30, at 172 (“Because the Court’s analysis in Tinker applies
to conduct ‘in class or out of it,’ Tinker is broad enough to encompass Internet speech.”).
102. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 937 (3d Cir. 2011)
(Smith, J., concurring); see also Bendlin, supra note 100, at 218–19 (discussing how courts
apply different analytical approaches including the geographic approach, the sufficient-nexus
approach, the reasonably foreseeable approach, and the intent or aimed-at-the-school
approach).
103. See infra Part II.A.
104. See infra Part II.B.
105. See infra Part II.B.
106. See infra Part II.C.
107. See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2004);
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979).
108. See Ceglia, supra note 98, at 959.
109. See Porter, 393 F.3d at 620; Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050.
110. Under general First Amendment principles, students would be treated as ordinary
citizens and their speech would only be regulated if it falls into one of the general excludable
carveouts like true threats. See Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment:
Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 276 (2001)
(“When off-campus, society must view minors not in what amounts to their occupational
status as students—minors play the role of student, just as if they went to work on a job—but
in their status as citizens of the United States.”).
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The Fifth Circuit adopted this approach in Porter v. Ascension Parish
School Board,111 where it held that a school district could not punish a
student for a violent drawing depicting his school “under a state of siege by
a gasoline tanker truck, missile launcher, helicopter, and various armed
persons.”112 The court reasoned that the picture could not be considered oncampus speech, or even speech directed at the campus, because the student
never intended for the picture to reach the campus and took no action to bring
it to school.113 As a result, the court did not apply Tinker’s less protective
standard and instead applied general First Amendment principles.114
The Second Circuit, in Thomas v. Board of Education,115 similarly chose
not to apply Tinker to off-campus speech116 when school officials “ventured
out of the school yard and into the general community where the freedom
accorded expression is at its zenith.”117 The Second Circuit stated that school
officials are granted “substantial autonomy within their academic domain”
and that this power “rests in part on the confinement of that power within the
metes and bounds of the school itself.”118 The court found that the conduct
in that case, the publication of a magazine parody, “was conceived, executed,
and distributed outside the school,” so school officials had exceeded their
powers when they punished the students for this out-of-school conduct.119
Judge D. Brooks Smith of the Third Circuit came to a similar conclusion
in J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District.120 He wrote
separately in a concurring opinion to address whether Tinker applies to offcampus speech.121 He stated that it does not “and that the First Amendment
protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it protects
speech by citizens in the community at large.”122
There are certain disadvantages to applying this geographical-nexus
test.123 Most obviously, it is difficult for school administrators to apply it
111. 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).
112. Id. at 611, 615, 620 (holding that Tinker does not apply to students’ off-campus
speech).
113. Id. at 615.
114. See id. at 616–18 (applying general First Amendment principles).
115. 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
116. Id. at 1050, 1053 n.18 (distinguishing Tinker in a case involving a publication printed
outside the school).
117. Id. at 1050.
118. Id. at 1052.
119. Id. at 1050.
120. 650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 936, 939 (“Applying Tinker to off-campus speech would create a precedent with
ominous implications. Doing so would empower schools to regulate students’ expressive
activity no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what subject matter it involves—so
long as it causes a substantial disruption at school.”); see also Layshock ex rel. Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (“It would be an unseemly and
dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s
home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can control that child when
he/she participates in school sponsored activities.”).
123. On-campus and off-campus distinctions should not determine whether schools may
regulate student speech, “just as a defendant’s location is no longer the sole determinant of
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when speech is in cyberspace.124 How will school administrators know
where the student was when he posted on Facebook or sent a text message to
a classmate? The advent of technologies like the internet, cell phones, and
social media, “and their sweeping adoption by students present new and
evolving challenges for school administrators, confounding previously
delineated boundaries of permissible regulations.”125 The internet makes it
nearly impossible to draw a line between on- and off-campus speech.
Therefore, a geographical boundary is arguably not the best solution.126 It
seems that the “‘schoolhouse gate’ cannot exist in a world where speech is
electronic, intangible, and can be instantly transmitted and accessed.”127
B. Schools May Sometimes Regulate Off-Campus Speech: Tinker Applies
if the School Satisfies Some Threshold Jurisdictional Test
Most circuit courts that consider the issue of whether schools may regulate
off-campus speech conclude that some form of threshold “jurisdictional” test
must be met before the Tinker standard is applied to off-campus speech.128
This section explores the different treatment of this issue among the
Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit courts. The Fourth Circuit and Eighth
Circuit apply Tinker only after threshold standards have been met. They
differ, however, in which threshold tests they use. The Fourth Circuit applies
a nexus test, which looks at how closely the offending speech is tied to the
school, while the Eighth Circuit asks if it is reasonably foreseeable that the

whether a state can reach him.” Rashmi Joshi, Comment, Sharing the Digital Sandbox: The
Effects of Ubiquitous Computing on Student Speech and Cyberbullying Jurisprudence, 53
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 629, 653 (2013) (“Overturning the rigid geographical analysis of
Pennoyer, the Court stated in International Shoe that a state may have jurisdiction over a
defendant if said defendant has certain minimum contacts within the state, and . . . if the suit
does not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”).
124. See McDonald, supra note 60, at 746 (“[I]n truth[,] cyberspace knows no geographic
boundaries and cybercommunications are much more pervasive, enduring and easy to engage
in than communications in the ‘physical’ world.”).
125. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 392 (5th Cir. 2015).
126. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 598
(W.D. Pa. 2007) (“It is clear that the test for school authority is not geographical. . . . [S]chools
have an undoubted ability to govern student conduct at school-sponsored field trips, sporting
events, academic competitions and during transit to and from such activities.”), aff’d in part
on reh’g en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d. Cir. 2011).
127. Ceglia, supra note 98, at 976.
128. C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing how
federal courts first consider “the threshold question of whether the school could permissibly
regulate the student’s off-campus speech at all”); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified
Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Some courts . . . have considered
the location of the speech to be an important threshold issue for the court to resolve before
applying the Supreme Court’s student speech precedents.”); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem
Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002) (discussing that a court must determine if speech
was on-campus speech subject to Tinker or off-campus speech “which would arguably be
subject to some higher level of First Amendment protection”); McDonald, supra note 60, at
736 (“[Most federal courts of appeals] concluded that some form of threshold standard must
be met before the Tinker standard, rather than ordinary free speech principles, applied to the
case.”).
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speech will reach the school.129 Refusing to pick one, the Ninth Circuit
applies both threshold tests.
1. The Fourth Circuit’s “Sufficient-Nexus” Test
The Fourth Circuit uses a “sufficient-nexus” threshold test to determine
whether schools may discipline students for their off-campus bullying
speech. In Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,130 Kara Kowalski, a high
school senior, was suspended from school for creating and posting to a
MySpace webpage that was largely dedicated to ridiculing a fellow
student.131 Kowalski commenced an action against the Berkeley County
School District, contending that the school district violated her free speech
rights under the First Amendment.132 Kowalski alleged that “the School
District was not justified in regulating her speech because it did not occur
during a ‘school-related activity,’ but rather was ‘private out-of-school
speech.’”133 The Fourth Circuit admitted that Kowalski pushed her
computer’s keys in her home, but explained that she knew that the webpage
and her posts could reasonably be expected to reach the school.134 The court
recognized that there is a limit to the scope of a school’s interest “in the order,
safety, and well-being of its students when the speech at issue originates
outside the schoolhouse gate,”135 but the court was satisfied that there was a
“sufficient nexus”136 between the offending speech and the school’s
pedagogical interests to justify the action taken by school officials.137 The
court reasoned, “[E]very aspect of the webpage’s design and implementation
was school-related. Kowalski designed the website for ‘students,’ . . . she
sent it to students inviting them to join; and those who joined were mostly
students.”138 The court used the word “nexus” again: “Suffice it to hold here
that, where such speech has a sufficient nexus with the school, the
Constitution is not written to hinder school administrators’ good faith efforts
to address the problem.”139

129. Whether it is reasonably foreseeable that speech will reach the school is a different
question from Tinker’s question, which asks whether school authorities could anticipate that
expression would substantially interfere with the work of the school.
130. 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
131. Id. at 567.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 573 (“Kowalski indeed pushed her computer’s keys in her home, but she knew
that the electronic response would be, as it in fact was, published beyond her home and could
reasonably be expected to reach the school or impact the school environment.”).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 577.
137. Id. at 573 (“[W]e are satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech to Musselman High
School’s pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong to justify the action taken by school
officials in carrying out their role as the trustees of the student body’s well-being.”).
138. Id. at 576.
139. Id. at 577.
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2. The Eighth Circuit’s “Reasonably Foreseeable” Test
The Eighth Circuit uses a reasonably foreseeable threshold test to
determine whether schools may discipline students for their off-campus
internet speech.140 In S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School
District,141 twin brothers were suspended from their school because they
created a blog142 where they posted offensive, racist, sexist, and degrading
comments about particular classmates.143 The court held that Tinker applied
to the off-campus online speech because it was reasonably foreseeable that
the speech would reach the school or affect its environment.144 The court
explained that it was reasonably foreseeable that the blog posts would be
brought to the attention of school authorities because the posts were “targeted
at” the school and even accessed by students on school computers.145
3. The Ninth Circuit’s Application of Both Threshold Tests
The Ninth Circuit has not adopted one specific threshold test to determine
whether schools may discipline students for their off-campus speech.
Instead, it applies both threshold tests.
In Wynar ex rel. Wynar v. Douglas County School District,146 the Ninth
Circuit held that school officials did not violate Landon Wynar’s First
Amendment rights by expelling him for sending threatening messages about
planning a school shooting from his home to his friends.147 The court noted
that some circuits apply threshold tests in determining whether schools may
regulate off-campus speech. The court explained that “the Fourth Circuit
requires that the speech have a sufficient ‘nexus’ to the school, while the
Eighth Circuit requires that it be ‘reasonably foreseeable that the speech will
reach the school community.’”148 The Ninth Circuit refused “to try and craft
a one-size fits all approach” and declined to choose between the two
threshold tests.149 Instead, the court applied both tests and held that both
were satisfied in the case of a threatened school shooting.150 The court
explained that, “[g]iven the subject and addresses of Landon’s messages, it
is hard to imagine how their nexus to the school could have been more direct;

140. See generally, e.g., S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d
771 (8th Cir. 2012); D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011).
141. 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012).
142. The blog was called “NorthPress” and it was named after Lee’s Summit North High
School. Id. at 773.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 778 (“[T]he NorthPress posts ‘could reasonably be expected to reach the school
or impact the environment.’” (quoting Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573)).
145. Id.
146. 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013).
147. Id. at 1064, 1070.
148. Id. at 1068 (citation omitted) (first quoting Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573; then quoting
S.J.W., 696 F.3d at 777).
149. Id. at 1069.
150. Id.
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for the same reasons, it should have been reasonably foreseeable to Landon
that his messages would reach campus.”151
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in C.R. v. Eugene School District 4J152 did not
choose just one test to apply to off-campus speech.153 Rather, it concluded,
“under either [threshold] test, the School District had the authority to
discipline C.R. for his off-campus speech.”154
In this case, the court considered whether a school may discipline a student
for off-campus sexual harassment.155 It was a matter of first impression. In
the case, C.R., a twelve-year-old boy, sexually harassed two disabled
students while the students walked home from school.156 As a result, the
school suspended C.R. for two days.157 C.R.’s parents challenged his
suspension under the First Amendment and argued that the school lacked this
disciplinary authority because the harassment occurred off campus in a
public park.158 The Ninth Circuit noted that there were no “directly
analogous decisions from any other circuit” and that “the vast majority of the
law . . . concerns . . . internet speech.”159 Following its precedent in Wynar,
the court applied both the nexus and reasonably foreseeable tests.160
The harassing speech satisfied the sufficient-nexus test because (1) all of
the individuals involved were students, (2) “the incident took place on a path
that begins at the schoolhouse door,” (3) the school’s dismissal schedule
“brought the students together on the bike path,” and (4) “it is a reasonable
exercise of the School District’s in loco parentis authority to be concerned
with its students’ well being as they begin their homeward journey at the end
of the school day.”161
The harassment speech satisfied the reasonably foreseeable test because
(1) “administrators could reasonably expect the harassment’s effects to spill
over into the school environment,” and (2) “[a]dministrators could also
reasonably expect students to discuss the harassment in school.”162 The court
explained that “a student who is routinely subject to harassment while
walking home from school may be distracted during school hours by the
prospect of the impending harassment.”163

151. Id.
152. 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016).
153. Id. at 1150–51.
154. Id. at 1150.
155. Id. at 1145.
156. Id. at 1146.
157. Id. at 1147.
158. Id. at 1145–46.
159. Id. at 1150.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1150–51 (“Although the harassment at issue in this case took place off school
property, it was closely tied to the school.”).
162. Id. at 1151.
163. Id.
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4. The Limitations of Threshold Tests
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits require schools to overcome threshold tests
that are poorly defined, confusing, inefficient, and redundant. The Fourth
Circuit’s sufficient-nexus threshold test, which asks whether a student’s offcampus speech was tied closely enough to the school to permit its
regulation,164 has its limitations. First, the Fourth Circuit does not provide
clear guidance as to what constitutes a “sufficient nexus.”165 Second, the test
is confusing because different courts use different versions of the sufficientnexus test.166
The Eighth Circuit’s reasonably foreseeable threshold test, which asks
whether it was reasonably foreseeable that off-campus speech would reach
the school,167 is unclear and almost always satisfied. It is unclear because in
S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson, the court did not specify who must be able to
reasonably foresee that speech will reach the school.168 Instead, the court
relied on language from other courts without specifying whether the test
should be employed from the vantage point of a reasonable person, the
student wrongdoer, the student victim, or school authorities.169 As a result,
courts are applying the threshold test from different vantage points. In
Wynar, the Ninth Circuit applied the Eighth Circuit’s reasonably foreseeable
threshold test from the bully’s vantage point—the court stated that “it should
have been reasonably foreseeable to Landon” that his bullying speech would
reach the school.170 In contrast, in C.R., the Ninth Circuit applied the Eighth

164. See supra notes 130–39 and accompanying text.
165. One lower court has admitted, “It is unclear, however, when such a nexus exists.” J.C.
ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
166. Compare Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587,
600 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that a nexus was not established because there were several gaps
in the causation link between the speech and a disruption), aff’d in part on reh’g en banc, 650
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), and Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. 650 F.3d 205,
221 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., concurring) (“Speech that neither relates to school nor
occurs on campus or during a school sanctioned event will in all likelihood lack a reasonable
nexus to school . . . .”), with J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585,
2008 WL 4279517, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008) (“The facts that we are presented with
establish much more of a connection between the off-campus action and on-campus effect.
The website addresses the principal of the school. Its intended audience is students at the
school. A paper copy of the website was brought into school, and the website was discussed
in school. The picture on the profile was appropriated from the school district’s website.”),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part on reh’g en banc, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), and J.S. ex rel. H.S.
v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865–67 (Pa. 2002) (finding that a nexus was
established because the speech was aimed at a specific audience of students and the website
was accessed at school).
167. See supra notes 140–45 and accompanying text.
168. S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir.
2012) (“[The online posts] could reasonably be expected to reach the school or impact [its]
environment.”).
169. See id. at 777 (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007)).
170. Wynar ex rel. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013)
(emphasis added).
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Circuit’s reasonably foreseeable threshold test from the school
administrators’ vantage point.171
Another limitation of the reasonably foreseeable threshold test is that it
will almost always be foreseeable that student internet speech regarding
school issues will reach the school audience.172 Moreover, even noninternet
speech regarding nonschool issues will be within the school’s jurisdiction so
long as the bully and the victim go to the same school.173 For these reasons,
it would be more efficient174 for courts to go straight to Tinker’s test and ask
whether school authorities could reasonably forecast a “substantial disruption
of or material interference with school activities.”175
C. Schools May Always Regulate Off-Campus Speech:
Tinker Applies to Off-Campus Speech
Many courts analyzing off-campus speech that is subsequently brought to
campus or to the attention of school authorities apply Tinker regardless of
where the speech originated.176 These courts apply Tinker to speech that
originates both on and off campus without first applying a threshold test.177
Under this approach, speech’s geographic origin is not relevant.178

171. C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A]dministrators
could reasonably expect the harassment’s effects to spill over into the school environment.”).
172. Anything published in cyberspace could ultimately end up at school by means of a
phone, iPad, or computer. See Lindsay J. Gower, Note, Blue Mountain School District v. J.S.
ex rel. Snyder: Will the Supreme Court Provide Clarification for Public School Officials
Regarding Off-Campus Internet Speech?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 709, 730 (2013) (“The target of
most student Internet speech will be the students’ friends—those who are most likely to
understand and appreciate the speech and who are likely to also be students at the school.”).
173. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
174. See infra Part III.A.2.
175. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
176. See, e.g., Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970–71 (5th Cir. 1972)
(applying Tinker where a student-created underground newspaper was authored and
distributed off campus, but some of the newspapers turned up on campus); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v.
Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[T]he
majority of courts will apply Tinker where speech originating off campus is brought to school
or to the attention of school authorities, whether by the author himself or some other means.”);
Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (applying
Tinker where a student composed a degrading top-ten list and distributed it off campus to
friends via email, but one recipient subsequently printed and carried it onto school grounds);
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (applying
Tinker to a website created by a student off campus that criticized the school administration
where another student accessed the website at school and showed it to a teacher); see also
McDonald, supra note 60, at 736 (“[T]he Tinker standard applied regardless of where the
student speech occurred as long as it somehow made its way onto campus.”).
177. Put another way, some courts treat Tinker’s substantial-disruption prong as the
threshold jurisdictional test. This approach merges the jurisdictional question (whether
schools may regulate speech generally) with the merits question (whether schools may
regulate the speech in a particular instance).
178. McDonald, supra note 60, at 736 (discussing how some federal district courts take the
approach that the geographic location of student speech is immaterial); see LaVine v. Blaine
Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988–92 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing the speech under Tinker without
giving any consideration to the fact that the poem was written outside of school); J.C. ex rel.
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Opponents of this approach include those who, despite believing schools
should teach students not to bully,179 insist that disciplining students for offcampus speech simply goes too far.180 Additionally, many scholars have
criticized this approach by pointing out that there are sufficient remedies and
redress in the civil181 and criminal182 justice systems. These scholars argue
that students would unfairly “face two sets of punishments: liability in court
for civil or criminal violations and school discipline.”183 Others criticize this
approach as interfering with parents’ fundamental liberty interest in raising
their children.184
Courts are clearly divided on whether schools may regulate students’ offcampus speech. While some courts hold that schools may either always or
never regulate off-campus speech, the majority of courts allow regulation
only when various threshold tests are satisfied.
III. TINKER AS BOTH A THRESHOLD JURISDICTIONAL TEST
AND A SUBSTANTIVE TEST
As discussed in Part II, circuit courts do not know how to evaluate whether
schools can discipline students for off-campus speech. Consequently,
victims of bullying have minimal protections or recourse for off-campus
bullying. The Supreme Court must step in and provide guidance for
addressing off-campus bullying speech.
This Note argues that Tinker should be applied as both a threshold
jurisdictional test and a substantive test.185 Under this approach, schools
would be allowed to regulate off-campus student speech when school
R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (“[U]nder the majority rule . . . the geographic origin of the
speech is not material; Tinker applies to both on-campus and off-campus speech.”).
179. The government has differentiated roles. Schools are afforded great latitude and
flexibility when it comes to choosing curriculums and lesson plans because the school is
viewed as an educator. Therefore, schools can choose to teach students about bullying. See
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 910 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[A]ctions by the
government as educator do not raise the same First Amendment concerns as actions by the
government as sovereign.”).
180. See supra notes 110–22 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Calvert, supra note 110, at 245 (“[I]f traditional and generally applicable offcampus civil law remedies such as libel are available for teachers and principals who feel
defamed by student speech that originates off campus, then why should school administrators
be able to mete out a second, in-school punishment against those students?”).
182. See, e.g., id. (“[I]f generally applicable criminal threat statutes exist to punish students
for off-campus expression that allegedly menaces school personnel or other students, why
should a school be able to double-dip and punish those students as well?”).
183. See Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anonymous
Internet Forums, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 144 (2003).
184. “[T]he custodial parent has a constitutional right to determine, without undue
interference by the state, how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child.” Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 95 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Caplan, supra note 183, at 144
(discussing how off-campus student behavior is not within the jurisdiction of the school, but
is largely within the jurisdiction of parents).
185. This approach accepts that schools have the authority to discipline students for offcampus speech. And because private schools may discipline students for off-campus speech,
this approach would put public school administrators on the same playing field as private
school administrators.
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authorities could reasonably forecast a “substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities.”186 In this way, students’ off-campus
speech would be treated as an additional carveout to the First Amendment.
But, importantly, this carveout would only apply when Tinker is satisfied.187
This Part argues that schools should have the authority to regulate offcampus speech. Part III.A explains that allowing schools to regulate offcampus speech is beneficial for society. Specifically, it fosters safe learning
environments in schools and efficiency in courtrooms. Part III.B describes
how existing criminal and civil remedies inadequately address off-campus
bullying. Part III.C discusses the many policy reasons that support giving
schools the authority to regulate off-campus bullying speech. And Part III.D
explains that allowing schools to regulate off-campus speech does not leave
bullies susceptible to unfair discipline.
A. Allowing Schools to Regulate Off-Campus Speech Is Necessary
It is important for schools to have the authority to regulate student speech
that occurs both on and off campus because schools are tasked with creating
safe environments conducive to learning.188 Bullying that occurs either on
or off campus causes real harm and prevents schools from providing safe
learning environments.189
Whether or not schools can regulate speech should not rest on a distinction
between on-campus and off-campus conduct.190 Instead, schools should
have the authority to regulate student speech regardless of where it occurs so
long as there are “substantial effects” at school.191 If the off-campus bullying
speech causes—or, in the view of school administrators, is likely to cause—
a substantial disruption at school, then the school should be able to discipline
the bully.192
Courts also need to have an efficient way to analyze these types of claims.
The reasonably foreseeable threshold test, which asks whether it is
foreseeable that speech may end up at school, is very similar to Tinker’s first
prong, which asks whether it is foreseeable that speech will cause a
186. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
187. The Tinker standard is satisfied when school administrators could reasonably forecast
a substantial disruption in school. Id.
188. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
189. See supra Part I; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text.
191. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2017) (prohibiting off-campus bullying if such
bullying “(i) creates a hostile environment at school for the student against whom such
bullying was directed, or (ii) infringes on the rights of the student against whom such bullying
was directed at school, or (iii) substantially disrupts the education process or the orderly
operation of a school”).
192. Courts apply the “effects” test from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), in cases
where there are insufficient minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction. The Court’s
rationale in Calder should apply to a school’s regulatory authority to discipline students. See
Puiszis, supra note 30, at 224 (“While the jurisdictional question Calder addressed is
analytically distinct, conceptually the logic of the Court’s rationale generally can be applied
here, given the nature of Internet speech.”).

694

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

substantial disruption at school. Therefore, it would be more efficient to
collapse the reasonably foreseeable threshold test into Tinker’s first prong.
Under this approach, courts would continue to apply Tinker’s test from the
vantage point of school administrators.193
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Wynar and C.R. suggest that
when the sufficient-nexus threshold test is met, the reasonably foreseeable
threshold test will likely also be met.194 Therefore, the sufficient-nexus
threshold test is not materially different from the reasonably foreseeable
threshold test.195 Rather, it seems like courts may be labeling their factdriven analyses as “threshold tests” when, in reality, each case’s outcome is
fact specific.196
For these reasons, it would be more efficient for courts to apply Tinker and
analyze the facts of each case197 instead of hiding behind threshold tests.
B. Existing Legal Remedies Do Not Work
Another reason schools should have regulatory authority to discipline
students for off-campus speech is that existing criminal and civil remedies
fail the victims of off-campus bullying. This section discusses the
inadequacy of criminal and civil remedies to address off-campus bullying.
1. Criminal Remedies Fail the Victims of Off-Campus Bullying
There has been little success prosecuting cyberbullies.198 An incident at
Horace Greeley High School “highlights the inability of the legal system to
Horace Greeley administrators
effectively deter cyberbullying.”199
suspended two male students for five days because they posted personal
193. Nonetheless, nothing prevents school administrators from ratcheting down discipline
for students who could not reasonably foresee the consequences of their bullying speech.
194. See supra notes 146–63.
195. Gower, supra note 172, at 727, 730 (discussing reasons why the Supreme Court
continues to deny certiorari in student free-speech cases). “[T]he circuit courts of appeal are
not in disagreement over the rule of law to apply; rather, the diverging results and analyses in
the different circuits are merely based on factual considerations.” Id. at 727.
196. The Fifth Circuit has not adopted one specific threshold test to determine whether
schools may discipline students for their off-campus speech. Instead, it explicitly declined to
“adopt or reject approaches advocated by other circuits,” like the sufficient-nexus test or the
reasonably foreseeable test, because the outcome of each case is “heavily influenced by the
facts in each matter.” Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 383, 396, 400 (5th Cir.
2015) (holding that a student could be disciplined for his off-campus speech without violating
the First Amendment where he “posted a rap recording containing threatening language
against two high school teachers/coaches on the Internet”).
197. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1494 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that
emails expressing sexual interest in violence against women did not constitute “a
communication containing a threat” within the meaning of the statute); see also DANIELLE
KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 19 (2014) (“Victims are told not to expect any
help: ‘This is the INTERNET folks . . . . There are no laws here, at least not clearly defined
ones.’” (alteration in original) (quoting a comment on a blog post)).
199. Todd D. Erb, Note, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish
Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 260 (2008).
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information about female students—“including family history, phone
numbers, addresses and, most troubling, sexual experience”—on a
website.200 The principal called the police and the boys were “charged with
second-degree harassment, which carries a sentence of up to one year in jail
and a $1,000 fine.”201 But, a few days later, the Westchester District
Attorney announced that, while some of the material was “‘offensive and
abhorrent,’ it did not meet the legal definition of harassment and [the]
criminal charges against the two boys would be dropped.”202 Clearly, there
were no criminal remedies available to address this behavior.
If they are available, criminal remedies are often ineffective. And even in
the limited instances where criminal remedies can provide adequate redress,
they are often more detrimental than rehabilitative for the bullies themselves.
Specifically, criminal remedies contribute to the school-to-prison pipeline.203
Additionally, they do not serve any educational purpose.204 Young students
make mistakes. And school principals can help bullies learn from their
mistakes without involving the police.205
2. Civil Remedies Fail the Victims of Off-Campus Bullying
Civil remedies do not provide bullying victims with recourse when offcampus speech substantially disrupts the learning environment but does not

200. Amy Benfer, Cyber Slammed, SALON (July 3, 2001, 7:03 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2001/07/03/cyber_bullies/ [https://perma.cc/QL8C-4DMM].
201. Id.
202. Id. Alternatively, this could have been pursued as doxing, “a form of cyberharassment
involving the public release of personal information that can be used to identify or locate an
individual.” See Julia M. MacAllister, Note, The Doxing Dilemma: Seeking a Remedy for the
Malicious Publication of Personal Information, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2453 (2017)
(discussing existing statutory schemes and the need for an effective and consistent legal
remedy for doxing).
203. The school-to-prison pipeline is “a disturbing national trend wherein children are
funneled out of public schools and into the juvenile and criminal justice systems.” See Schoolto-Prison Pipeline, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/school-prisonpipeline [https://perma.cc/A57N-68T3] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
204. See Marilyn Elias, The School-to-Prison Pipeline, TEACHING TOLERANCE MAG.,
Spring 2013, at 38, 38–40 (discussing that school discipline fosters learning in ways that
criminal and punitive discipline do not).
205. See infra Part III.C.
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rise to the level of a “true threat.”206 In other words, there is a category of
hurtful speech that never makes it to court because it is not threatening.207
Moreover, litigation is expensive and student victims should not have to
go to court for redress. Going to court is detrimental to both the victim and
the bully. For example, if student victims of cyberbullying want to file libel
actions, their bullies can use the affirmative defense that the hurtful
statements are true.208 So if the bully called the victim a “slut” or “fat,” the
bully could use the defense that the statements are true.209 This type of
litigation would likely hurt the victim even more, while also inaccurately
teaching the bully that actions do not have consequences. It is a lose-lose
situation.
In sum, civil remedies fail to provide bullying victims with proper redress
because bullies often use speech that is neither actually threatening nor meets
the legal standard of libel. And even in the limited instances where civil
remedies can provide adequate redress, they are often expensive and harmful
for the victim.
C. Policy Reasons Support Granting Schools Broad Regulatory Authority
over Off-Campus Bullying Speech
This section discusses why giving schools regulatory authority over offcampus bullying speech is good public policy. First, school systems are
better suited than local police departments and courts when it comes to
working with children and regulating student speech. Second, teachers and
school administrators need legal support to teach and run schools. And third,
all forms of off-campus bullying should be treated equally.
1. School Systems Are a More Appropriate Regulator
“The determination of what manner of [student] speech . . . is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board”210 and not the courts
206. The phrase “true threat” is a constitutional term of art used to describe a category of
speech that the First Amendment does not protect. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,
708 (1969); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 782 (E.D. Mich.
2002) (finding that a website containing a list of students that one student wished would die
and included a “mission” for all those reading the website to “[s]tab someone for no reason[,]
then set them on fire[,] throw them off a cliff, watch them suffer and with their last breath, just
before everything goes black, spit on their face” did not constitute a true threat); see also Lisa
L. Swem, Sticks and Stones in Cyberspace, LEADERSHIP INSIDER, Aug. 2006, at 5, 11; Erb,
supra note 199, at 271 (“[M]any school officials are frustrated and left wondering what can
be done to address speech that does not rise to the level of a ‘true threat’ . . . but still negatively
affects the school environment and the students that attend the school.”).
207. Speech is a “true threat” if a reasonable person would interpret it “as a serious
expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm.” See Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special
Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002).
208. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975) (“It is true that in defamation
actions, where the protected interest is personal reputation, the prevailing view is that truth is
a defense . . . .”).
209. See Erb, supra note 199, at 279.
210. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); see also Safford Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 n.1 (2009) (“[S]tandards of conduct for schools
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because school systems are very involved with parents and children in the
community.211 First, parent-teacher conferences often take place several
times a year to keep parents informed about their children. At these meetings,
teachers team up with parents to better meet students’ academic and
behavioral needs. Parent-teacher partnerships are effective because they
often lead to higher student achievement.212 Second, parent-teacher
organizations (PTOs) give parents another opportunity to be involved in
school affairs. Parents often act as volunteers in schools, but they can also
participate in the educational process by attending local school meetings.
Third, parents are invited to attend school board meetings to voice opinions
and concerns about educational policies affecting the local community.
In contrast, criminal and judicial systems are much less willing to involve
parents in their affairs. Police departments are too busy to look into small
burglaries,213 much less bullying that affects students at school.214 And court
dockets are already overloaded.215
For these reasons, it is most practical to allow school systems to regulate
off-campus bullying speech that affects students on campus.

are for school administrators to determine without second-guessing by courts lacking the
experience to appreciate what may be needed.” (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
342 n.9 (1985))); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 428 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[N]o one wishes to substitute courts for school boards, or to turn the
judge’s chambers into the principal’s office.”); Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch.
Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[J]udges are incompetent to tell school
authorities how to run schools in a way that will preserve an atmosphere conducive to
learning . . . .”); THOMAS, supra note 50, at 83 (“[T]he judiciary has been reluctant to interfere
with school boards’ prerogatives in selecting and eliminating instructional materials.”).
211. Justin Patchin, Opinion, Most Bullying Cases Aren’t Criminal, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM
FOR DEBATE (Sept. 30, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/09/30/
cyberbullying-and-a-students-suicide/most-bullying-cases-arent-criminal [https://perma.cc/
WXK5-GV8L] (“The vast majority of cyberbullying incidents can and should be handled
informally: with parents, schools, and others working together to address the problem before
it rises to the level of a violation of criminal law.”).
212. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Building Parent-Teacher Relationships, READING ROCKETS,
http://www.readingrockets.org/article/building-parent-teacher-relationships
[https://perma.cc/C8FP-KHN5] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (“Substantial evidence exists
showing that parent involvement benefits students, including raising their academic
achievement.”).
213. See Patrick Scott & Ellie Kempster, Revealed: How Likely Is It That the Police Will
Manage to Catch the Person Who Burgles Your House?, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 19, 2017, 4:04
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/19/nine-10-home-burglaries-now-gounsolved-effective-police-force/ [https://perma.cc/EJ93-HC2C].
214. Erb, supra note 199, at 283.
215. Id.; see also Martha Neil, US Courts: Federal Litigants Face Record Civil-Case
Backlog Due to Shortage of Judges, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 4:55 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/us_courts_federal_litigants_face_record_civil_case
_backlog_due_to_shortage [https://perma.cc/X2H9-P7MP] (discussing the backlog of cases
and mentioning that “the federal prison population has grown by more than 50 percent”);
Sudhin Thanawala, Wheels of Justice Slow at Overloaded Federal Courts, CHI. TRIB. (Sept.
28, 2015, 12:32 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/sns-bc-us--federalcase-backlog-20150927-story.html [https://perma.cc/6ULH-LSFD] (“[F]ederal district courts
have seen a rise in recent years in the time it takes to get civil cases to trial and resolve felony
criminal cases as judges’ workloads have increased . . . .”).
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2. Teachers and School Administrators Are Entitled to Legal Protection
Teachers and school administrators need support from the legal system to
do their jobs. Today, teachers fear being sued by both bullying victims and
bullies.216 Specifically, teachers may be sued by bullying victims if they do
not discipline bullies and by bullies if they do.217
Bullies cannot get away with bullying merely because parents, “the
primary agents in the pediatric safety system[,] falter in preventing and
responding effectively.”218 Instead, “professionals who teach the young
[should] assume additional responsibilities as protectors, cyber ethicists, and
While “good” teachers will assume additional
disciplinarians.”219
responsibilities, “smart” teachers will do so only when they have legal
support.220
Teachers will have the support they need to control their classrooms if the
Supreme Court recognizes schools’ authority to regulate off-campus bullying
speech. Specifically, teachers will be able to discipline students for offcampus bullying speech that substantially disrupts the classroom
environment without fearing lawsuits.
3. It Is Necessary to Treat Cyberbullying and Other Forms of
Off-Campus Bullying Equally
The majority of off-campus bullying cases involve cyberbullying.
Accordingly, while the Supreme Court may be more inclined to hear a
cyberbullying case, it is still important for the Court to recognize that schools
should have the authority to regulate other forms of off-campus bullying
speech.
216. See Abrams, supra note 58, at 187 (discussing how school authorities often avoid
meaningful discipline because they fear that students and their parents will respond with
lawsuits); see also Elizabeth Elizalde, Family of New Jersey Cheerleader Suing School
District After Cyberbullying Led to Girl’s Suicide, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017, 12:52
PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/n-family-suing-school-not-stopping-girlcyberbullying-article-1.3375238 [https://perma.cc/AQ36-GUPV].
217. See Fenn, supra note 23, at 2765 (discussing how schools may be liable to victims of
cyberbullying if they did not act aggressively to combat it or to off-campus bullies if courts
find that schools violated cyberbullies’ First Amendment rights).
218. Abrams, supra note 58, at 224.
219. Id. (“Teachers and administrators frequently assume responsibility not only as
classroom instructors, but also as counselors, confidantes, psychologists, hygienists,
nutritionists, and various other authority figures essential to the growth and development of
an entire generation of children.”); see also Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d
615, 635 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Educators serve as surrogate parents, psychologists, social workers,
and security guards, above and beyond their normal teaching responsibilities.”).
220. See Tresa Baldas, School Suits, NAT’L L.J. (May 17, 2004, 12:00 AM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/900005407928/school-suits/
[https://perma.cc/QQH9-TEQV] (discussing an interactive poll of 800 public school teachers
and principals nationwide, which found that 82 percent of teachers and 77 percent of principals
agree that fear of lawsuits has created a “defensive teaching mode . . . motivated by a desire
to avoid” litigation); id. (“[N]early 8 in 10 teachers, 78%, say students are quick to remind
them that they have rights or that their parents can sue, . . . [and] 62% of principals said that
they have been threatened with a legal challenge . . . .”).
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Some may argue that cyberbullying is the only form of off-campus speech
that should be regulated by schools because the hurtful speech can be
accessed anytime and anywhere, including at school.221 And while it is true
that cyberbullying has an “everywhere” and “all the time” effect222 there are
also instances where in-person bullying has this effect.223 This was found to
be the case in C.R. v. Eugene School District 4J, where a student was
suspended for harassing two disabled students while walking home from
school.224 In these instances, schools should have the authority to discipline
students.
D. There Should Be Adequate Safeguards for Those Accused of Bullying
Even though this Note argues that schools should have broad authority to
regulate student bullying speech, significant procedural safeguards should be
available for those accused of bullying. Allowing schools to protect bullying
victims by regulating off-campus speech should not swing the pendulum too
far by subjecting bullies to unfair discipline without having an opportunity to
be heard. And while “[t]here is no constitutional right to be a bully,”225 there
are many ways schools could ensure that bullies are treated fairly.
First, schools should provide all students and their families with written
notice before the school year begins that there will be zero tolerance for
bullying and that those who violate the school’s antibullying policy may be
disciplined and possibly suspended from school. The school’s antibullying
policy should also explicitly caution that students may be held responsible
both for off-campus and on-campus bullying.
Second, teachers and school administrators should only be permitted to
discipline students for off-campus speech in accordance with school district
policies and procedures. Students facing suspension or expulsion should, at
a minimum, be given notice of the charges against them and afforded a
hearing.226

221. Proponents of this view would allow schools to discipline students for bullying that
occurs on Facebook but not for bullying that occurs at a public park or during a playdate. See
supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
222. McDonald, supra note 60, at 746 (“[C]yberbullying can be engaged in with much less
effort or notice than traditional bullying, even anonymously, and the concomitant threat to the
targeted student’s psychological well being seems sufficiently greater to make it legitimate for
schools to take cognizance of such disputes and apply speech standards to them that take into
account the need to protect the learning environment for targeted students.”).
223. See supra notes 155–63 and accompanying text.
224. 835 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[The incident] occurred about five minutes after
school let out, a few hundred feet from campus.”).
225. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 264 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“Intimidation of one student by another, including intimidation by name calling, is the kind
of behavior school authorities are expected to control or prevent.”).
226. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572–76 (1975) (holding that a suspension without a
hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a case where an
Ohio statute guaranteed a free education to all residents).
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Third, like the imposition of other school sanctions, the type of discipline
should be proportional to the offense.227 Teachers and school administrators
should take various factors into account, including the student’s age, the
severity of the bullying, and whether the bully is a first-time offender.
Fourth, another protection for accused bullies should include the use of
positive behavior interventions and supports, which is becoming increasingly
popular.228 Today, many schools are moving away from traditional types of
discipline,229 like suspensions, because recent research shows that sending
students home from school may do them more harm than good.230 Therefore,
when school administrators consider the appropriate form of discipline for
students who have engaged in off-campus bullying speech, they should
examine whether to employ a form of positive behavior intervention or
support.231 Schools should use the least punitive measures available if they
are adequate to protect the victim and the school’s learning environment. But
there will still be times where suspensions are the only adequate remedy.
And when school administrators use their professional judgment to suspend
students, instead of administering positive behavior interventions, courts
should give schools great deference—because these decisions can save lives.
CONCLUSION
Bullying, both on and off campus, has far-reaching consequences. The
Supreme Court cases establishing the contours of free speech doctrine as
applied to public schools are outdated and ineffective because they do not
address off-campus bullying speech. The Supreme Court has had several
227. Types of discipline include, but are not limited to, receiving a detention, suspension,
or expulsion. Other creative forms of discipline may include getting “bully-related”
homework like writing an apology, losing a school privilege, or receiving a parent notification.
228. “Positive Behavior Interventions and Supports is a systems approach to establishing
the social culture and behavioral supports needed for all children in a school to achieve both
social and academic success.” Rob Horner, George Sugai & Timothy Lewis, Is School-Wide
Positive Behavior Support an Evidence-Based Practice?, PBIS (Apr. 2015),
https://www.pbis.org/research [https://perma.cc/49WZ-Q4MR]. It includes preventative and
responsive approaches that may be implemented with all students in a classroom and
intensified to support small groups or individual students. Id.
229. The current trend is for schools to limit the number of suspensions wherever possible.
See Jane Adams, Suspensions and Expulsions Decline as Districts Adopt Alternatives, State
Says, EDSOURCE (Jan. 13, 2016), https://edsource.org/2016/suspensions-and-expulsionsdecline-as-districts-adopt-alternatives-state-says/93297 [https://perma.cc/NP5L-6HBQ].
230. See Christopher Ferguson, Does Suspending Students Work?, TIME (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://ideas.time.com/2012/12/05/does-suspending-students-work/ [https://perma.cc/EFN6FRUU] (explaining that suspending a student does “nothing to teach appropriate alternative
behavior nor address underlying issues that may be causing the bad behavior”); LouAnne
Johnson,
Down
with
Detention!,
EDUC.
WEEK
(Nov.
30,
2004),
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2004/12/01/14johnson.h24.html
[https://perma.cc/
9Q8M-UH52] (“Using detention as a catchall cure for student misbehaviors is like using one
medicine for every physical ailment.”).
231. As a former first grade teacher, I have implemented several positive behavior
interventions for my students, including: (1) speaking to the student-bully about the impacts
of bullying, (2) hosting group interventions allowing student-bullies to apologize to studentvictims, and (3) creating behavior-management plans to reinforce positive “nonbullying”
behaviors.
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opportunities to define the parameters of student speech but has declined to
do so.232 As a result, educators and students must continue to guess how a
court would rule in any specific case.233 The Supreme Court should clarify
Tinker’s test as both a jurisdictional and substantive test. Doing so would
allow school administrators to regulate students’ off-campus bullying speech
and save lives.

232. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently denied certiorari in off-campus student speech
cases. See C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.
Ct. 2117 (2017); see also Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011).
233. Gower, supra note 172, at 722.

